I study the relation between shadow banking and financial stability in an economy in which banks are susceptible to self-fulfilling runs and in which government-backed deposit insurance is limited. Shadow banks issue only uninsured deposits while commercial banks issue both insured and uninsured deposits. The effect of shadow banking on financial stability is ambiguous and depends on the (exogenous) upper limit on insured deposits. If the upper limit on insured deposits is high, then the presence of a shadow banking sector is detrimental to financial stability; shadow banking creates systemic instability that would not be present if all deposits were held in the commercial banking sector. In contrast, if the upper limit on insured deposits is low, then the presence of a shadow banking sector is beneficial from a financial stability perspective; shadow banks absorb uninsured (and uninsurable) deposits from the commercial banking sector, thereby shielding commercial banks from runs. While runs may occur in the shadow banking sector, the situation without shadow banks and a larger amount of uninsured deposits held at commercial banks is worse.
Introduction
The recent decades have witnessed the growth of a so-called shadow banking sector in the United States, which provides very short-term claims similar to bank deposits outside the traditional banking system (Poszar et al. 2010 and Ricks 2012 provide good overviews).
1 Prominent examples of shadow bank claims are money market mutual fund shares, overnight asset backed commercial paper, or certain forms of repo. 2 Since the financial crisis of 2007-08, and especially since the run on money market mutual funds in September 2008 3 , the shadow banking sector is widely thought to pose a threat to financial stability.
In this paper, I present a theoretical argument why the financial stability implications of the shadow banking sector should not be analyzed separately from the cap on deposit insurance at traditional banks. Shadow banks cater mostly to institutional investors managing large cash-balances, who have a preference for extremely safe, short-term assets (Poszar 2011) . For instance, cash pools of large non-financial corporations today commonly amount to several hundred million USD, a large part of which is held in the form of shadow bank liabilities rather than traditional bank deposits (Poszar 2011) . Given the cap on deposit insurance, it is impossible or impracticable for these institutional cash pools to hold all of their funds in the form of insured bank deposits. In this context of limited deposit insurance, shadow banks can have the effect of absorbing uninsured (and uninsurable) short-term claims from the commercial banking sector. I show that this aspect of shadow banking may be beneficial from a financial stability perspective and a flow of uninsured deposits back into the commercial banking sector can be detrimental to aggregate financial stability. 1 There is no universally accepted definition of the term shadow banking. Some understand the term broadly, encompassing various sorts of financial intermediation outside the traditional banking system (e.g. FSB (2017)). Others define shadow banking more narrowly as the provision of 'money-like' (or bank-deposit-like) liabilities outside the traditional banking system (e.g. Poszar (2014) ). This paper has the latter, narrow definition in mind. 2 Short-term asset backed commercial paper has diminished in importance since the financial crisis. The money market mutual fund industry is in flux after reforms enacted in 2016 (see Cipriani et al. (2017) ). 3 Schmidt et al. (2016) provide a detailed description of the run on money market mutual funds in 2008. Episodes that can be characterized as bank runs were also observed in other segments of the shadow banking system such as the market for short-term asset backed commercial paper (Covitz et al. 2013, Kacperczyk and Schnabl 2010) .
I take the deposit insurance scheme, and in particular the cap on deposit insurance, as exogenous throughout the paper. Deriving the optimal level of the cap is not the subject of this paper. For a given deposit insurance scheme in place, I derive the structure of the financial system for which aggregate losses caused by systemic bank runs are minimized, and I compare it to the structure of the financial system that results in a competitive equilibrium. In this sense, the paper speaks to a regulator that cannot change the deposit insurance scheme in place.
Model Summary
The model features banks that sell claims which are redeemable on demand ('deposits') to households. Banks invest into riskless projects whose maturity exceeds the maturity of deposits. The short-term nature of the claims issued by banks is taken as given. Households choose at which banks to hold their deposits. In addition, households can choose to obtain deposit insurance for a limited amount of deposits. The limit on insured deposits is given by an exogenous parameter representing the cap on deposit insurance. The cap on deposit insurance amounts to a rationing of deposit insurance; it implies that some fraction of deposits are 'uninsurable'. The lower the deposit insurance cap, the higher the amount of uninsurable deposits. The only dimension in which banks differ from each other is the share of insured and uninsured deposits among the deposits issued. If all deposits issued by a bank are uninsured, the bank is labelled a 'shadow bank'. If some (not necessarily all) of the deposits issued by a bank are insured by deposit insurance, the bank is labelled a 'commercial bank '. 4 Since banks engage in maturity transformation, they are illiquid in an interim period, which opens up the possibility of self-fulfilling bank runs in the spirit of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) . Depositors never have an incentive to run on their insured deposits, which means that only uninsured deposits may potentially be withdrawn in a run. If a bank is hit by a run, it needs to sell assets on a secondary market. The liquidation price of assets in the secondary market is decreasing in the total amount of assets liquidated by banks ('cash-in-the-market pricing'). An individual bank is susceptible to a run if (i) the share of uninsured deposits at the bank is high and (ii) the liquidation price of assets is low. The liquidation price itself depends on how many other banks are hit by a run and sell assets, which introduces a systemic element to bank runs. The model abstracts from fundamental risk, so that these self-fulfilling, systemic bank runs constitute the only source of risk in the economy.
Main Results First I show that, for a given total amount of insured and uninsured deposits outstanding in the economy, the set of banks that can potentially be affected by a systemic run depends on the distribution of insured and uninsured deposits across banks. In general, the magnitude of systemic bank runs is minimized if the financial system exhibits a dual structure, with one sector that issues both insured and uninsured deposits (the commercial banking sector) and another sector that issues only uninsured deposits (the shadow banking sector). While systemic runs may occur in the shadow banking sector, the presence of the shadow banking sector also implies that the share of insured deposits at commercial banks is relatively high, so that systemic runs do not encompass the commercial banking sector. For this reason, a shadow banking sector can be beneficial from a financial stability perspective if the deposit insurance cap is low, that is, if the share of uninsurable deposits in the economy is high. To minimize aggregate losses caused by runs, the shadow banking sector should be set to the smallest size at which it absorbs enough of the uninsurable deposits from the commercial banking sector such as to keep the commercial banking sector shielded from systemic runs.
Next, I analyze the structure of the financial system that results in a competitive equilibrium and compare it to the optimal allocation as described above. Households may face conflicting incentives regarding the type of bank at which they hold deposits. On the one hand, the presence of insured depositors who do not participate in runs reduces expected losses caused by runs for uninsured depositors at commercial banks. This gives households an incentive to hold uninsured (and uninsurable) deposits at commercial banks rather than shadow banks. On the other hand, if the deposit insurance agency charges a fee on deposits issued by commercial banks, households have an incentive to move into shadow banks in order to avoid the fee. The shadow banking sector tends to be smaller than optimal if the share of uninsurable deposits is high (that is, if the deposit insurance cap is low). Intuitively, if aggregate financial stability is low, households have an incentive to move uninsurable deposits from the shadow banking sector into the more stable commercial banking sector, thereby increasing the share of uninsured deposits held at commercial banks, which causes the commercial banking sector to become susceptible to runs as well. In contrast, the shadow banking sector tends to be larger than optimal if the share of uninsurable deposits is low (that is, if the deposit insurance cap is high). In this case, the commercial banking sector will not be susceptible to systemic runs even if most (or all) uninsurable deposits are held at commercial banks. In a competitive equilibrium, households move deposits into the shadow banking sector in order to avoid the fee on commercial bank deposits. The equilibrium size of the shadow banking sector is such that shadow banks are susceptible to systemic runs and households are indifferent at the margin between investing in shadow banks prone to runs and paying the fee on commercial bank deposits.
A regulator aiming to implement the optimal size of the shadow banking sector, taking as given the deposit insurance cap in place, can achieve this with a two-pronged policy. First, impose a tax on shadow bank deposits that mimics the fee charged on commercial bank deposits. This prevents the shadow banking sector from growing too large relative to the optimal size. Second, impose a marginal tax on uninsured commercial bank deposits that exceed a certain amount. This limits the amount of uninsured deposits held at commercial banks and ensures that the shadow banking sector is not too small relative to the optimal size.
Related Literature In a recent paper, Davila and Goldstein (2016) study the optimal level of the cap on deposit insurance, including the case where runs have a systemic element as in the present paper. Increasing the cap has the benefit of reducing expected losses caused by runs but entails social costs such as deadweight losses of taxation. The present paper is complementary to Davila and Goldstein (2016) by showing that the trade-offs studied in Davila and Goldstein (2016) can be improved if, in addition to choosing the level of the cap, an appropriate distribution of insured and uninsured deposits across banks can be implemented. Another closely related paper is Luck and Schempp (2016) who study financial stability implications of the shadow banking sector in an economy in which commercial banks issue insured-and shadow banks uninsured short-term claims.
The magnitude of systemic runs increases in the size of the shadow banking sector. The present paper shows that some of the conclusions reached in Luck and Schempp (2016) regarding shadow banking and financial stability may be reversed if deposit insurance is limited and commercial banks issue both insured and uninsured deposits.
More generally, this paper is related to a recent theoretical literature studying the financial stability implications of the shadow banking sector. Hanson et al. (2015) characterize shadow banking and commercial banking as two different ways to provide riskless claims. Shadow banks create riskless claims by investing in relatively liquid assets that can be liquidated immediately if bad news arrive. In this sense the occurrence of fire sales in the shadow banking sector is inherent to shadow banks' business model. In Gertler et al. (2016) shadow banks are modelled as wholesale banks that issue debt to other (retail) banks. Due to a relatively low degree of agency frictions compared to retail banking, shadow banking can reduce the financial accelerator in the aftermath of real shocks. However, high leverage in the shadow banking sector can also lead to instability in the form of bank runs. Moreira and Savov (2017) characterize shadow banking as the provision of risky claims which are information-insensitive and therefore provide liquidity services. This leads to a socially desirable expansion of liquidity in normal times but makes the economy more vulnerable to changes in aggregate uncertainty. Martin et al. (2014) study run equilibria on various types of shadow banks, taking into account the specifics of the debt contracts used. Gennaioli et al. (2013) focus on shadow banks' role in the securitization process. While securitization allows for gains from trade between risk averse buyers of securities and risk neutral financial intermediaries, it also makes the financial system more vulnerable to aggregate shocks. Compared to the papers mentioned above, the present paper highlights that, in the context of limited deposit insurance, the presence or absence of a shadow banking sector affects the distribution of uninsurable short-term claims across different financial institutions, with consequences for financial stability. This paper abstracts of many issues relevant to shadow banking and should be seen as complementary to the papers mentioned above.
Finally, this paper's interest in the effect of deposit insurance design on the equilibrium structure of a financial system populated (potentially) by both commercial banks and shadow banks is shared by two recent papers by LeRoy and Singhania (2017) and Chrétien and Lyonnet (2017) , albeit with a somewhat different focus. LeRoy and Singhania (2017) study how deposit insurance pricing affects equilibrium portfolio choices of commercial banks and shadow banks. In Chrétien and Lyonnet (2017) , the deposit insurance scheme allows commercial banks to issue riskless debt in times of crisis, which enables them to act as a 'buyer of last resort' for assets usually held by shadow banks. This leads to a complementarity between commercial banking and shadow banking, and an extension of the deposit insurance scheme for commercial banks indirectly benefits shadow banks as well. In order to focus on the aspects that are most relevant for the main theme of this paper, I abstract from banks' portfolio choices and treat the secondary market for banks' assets as exogenous.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the environment. Section 3 discusses run equilibria. Section 4 derives the optimal structure of the financial system. Sections 5 and 6 discuss the competitive equilibria of the economy, first for the case where deposit insurance is costless for households (section 5) and then for the case where a fee is charged on commercial bank deposits (section 6). Section 7 discusses how the optimal structure of the financial system can be implemented in a competitive equilibrium.
The Model
The economy lasts for two periods, indexed by t=0,1. Period 1 is subdivided into beginning of period and end of period. There is an infinitely divisible good used for consumption and investment.
Two types of agents populate the economy in period 0: A continuum of households, indexed by h H r0, 1s and a continuum of banks, indexed by i I r0, 1s. Each household is born with an endowment of one unit of good. Banks are born without endowment. At the beginning of period 1, a continuum r0, 1s of agents called 'outside investors' are born, each with an endowment of λ S p0, 1q units of good.
In period 0, there is a riskless, constant returns to scale investment technology that returns one unit of good at the end of period 1 per unit of good invested in period 0. Investments cannot be terminated prematurely at the beginning of period 1. There is no other storage technology between periods 0 and 1.
Households maximize expected utility Erupc 1 qs, where c 1 ¥ 0 is defined as total consumption during period 1. Households are therefore indifferent about whether to consume at the beginning or at the end of period 1. Utility up¤q is strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable. Banks' utility is strictly increasing in both period 0 and period 1 consumption. Outside investors' utility is strictly increasing in period 1 consumption.
For reasons that are outside of the model, households only save in the form of demand deposits, which can be issued by banks in period 0. Banks can invest the proceeds from the sale of demand deposits in period 0 into the investment technology. Demand deposits issued by any bank i:
(i) stipulate the return rpiq which the bank pays to depositors at the end of period 1, per unit invested into the bank in period 0.
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(ii) allow depositors to withdraw an amount of good equal to the face value of the deposit already at the beginning of period 1. Depositors who withdraw early are served sequentially in random order, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) .
Since the investment technology pays out only at the end of period 1, banks are illiquid at the beginning of period 1. If households withdraw early, banks need to raise good by selling claims to the investment return to outside investors. Note that, since investments are fundamentally riskless, losses incurred by banks are always related to liquidation losses incurred at the beginning of period 1. Households are indifferent about when to consume during period 1, and I assume they withdraw early only if they have a strict incentive to do so.
The final element of the model is an exogenous scheme of limited deposit insurance. In period 0, after having bought demand deposits from banks, households can choose for which deposits to obtain deposit insurance. If households obtain deposit insurance for some of the deposits they bought, they are guaranteed to receive an amount of good equal to the face value of the deposits at the end of period 1. Whenever a bank is not able to pay out an amount of good corresponding to the face value of the insured deposits at the end of period 1, deposit insurance makes up for the difference. The total face value of insured deposits held by a household is limited to θ r0, 1s, where θ represents the 'cap' on deposit insurance. The cap amounts to a rationing of deposit insurance. Different to real-world deposit insurance arrangements, the cap is a cap per person, without a specific limit on insured deposits held at a certain bank. 6 Depositors may choose to obtain deposit insurance for some, but not all, of the deposits held at one particular bank. As a result, among the deposits issued by a given bank, some may be insured by deposit insurance while others are not.
In the baseline version of the model, households can obtain deposit insurance for deposits issued by all banks at no cost. 7 Deposit insurance payments are financed by levying a lump-sum tax on all households at the end of period 1. 8 The deposit insurance agency remains passive as events unfold. If banks have both insured and uninsured deposits outstanding at the end of period 1, banks are allowed to pay their uninsured depositors first, thereby shifting losses (in case the bank incurred losses) towards deposit insurance. 9 I abstract from any further issues related to moral hazard or asymmetric information; the face value of deposits sold in period 0 must be backed by a corresponding amount of real investment and banks commit to pay depositors in period 1 whenever they can, rather than running away with the investment return. Figure 1 sketches the timeline. 6 Modelling the cap as a cap per person and bank would call for a richer model that endogenizes the number of banks that offer insured deposits in equilibrium, for instance by introducing a fixed cost of opening a bank. See also section 6. 7 In section 6, I discuss a version of the model where banks can choose whether or not get access to deposit insurance, and a fee is charged on all deposits issued by banks with access to deposit insurance. 8 Consumption c 1 equals the total return received during period 1 from a household's investment into deposits (including any payment by deposit insurance in case some banks failed) minus taxes to deposit insurance. Since deposit insurance payments represent transfers from households to themselves, all households can pay the lump-sum tax in a symmetric allocation. In a hypothetical non-symmetric allocation in which some households' consumption level c 1 would go to negative if they paid the entire tax, these households consume c 1 0 and the tax will be increased accordingly for the remaining households. 9 Without loss of generality, I assume banks always make use of this possibility. See Schilling (2018) for a setting where the deposit insurance agency acts strategically and sets its forbearance policy optimally for given levels of deposit insurance coverage. 
Runs
When faced with withdrawals at the beginning of period 1, banks need to sell assets (claims to investment return) to outside investors in order to pay out the depositors who withdraw. 10 As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
From Diamond and Dybvig (1983) we know that the combination of payment-on-demand deposits and liquidation losses can lead to self-fulfilling run equilibria. Liquidation losses occur whenever assets trade below fundamental value. However, since depositors never have an incentive to with-10 A 'depositor' is a household that holds deposits (insured or uninsured) at a bank. 11 The order of the line is determined independently at each bank, which allows households to diversify away idiosyncratic risk regarding the order in the line by spreading their investment over many banks. See also the discussion in section 5 and footnote 20.
draw insured deposits early, susceptibility to runs depends also on the share of insured deposits among the deposits issued by a bank. (2) A bank with only insured depositors (ϑpiq 1) will never be susceptible to runs, independent of the liquidation price. A bank with no insured depositors (ϑpiq 0) will be susceptible to a run whenever p 1, that is, whenever assets trade below fundamental value. Banks that are hit by a run sell their entire portfolio on the secondary market. By cash-in-the-market pricing
(1), the liquidation price p thus depends on how many banks are hit by a run. This introduces a systemic element to runs; the larger the number of banks hit by a run, the larger the number of banks susceptible to a run.
Denote DpI I q as the total fundamental value of assets held by some subset of banks I I I, which is identical to the total face value of deposits issued by banks I I . The liquidation price on the secondary market in a scenario where all banks in I I are hit by a run then equals ppDpI I qq. The economy is said to exhibit a run equilibrium encompassing all banks in I I iff:
If condition (3) is fulfilled then, given that all banks in I I are hit by a run, all banks in I I are susceptible to a run. We proceed with the following result: Proof: By (1), the liquidation price p is decreasing in the number of banks that liquidate their portfolio. It follows that f pϑq is an increasing function mapping r0, 1s into itself. By Tarski's fixed point theorem, the set of fixed points of f pϑq is non-empty and has a greatest element, which will be denoted by ϑ sr . We also have that ϑ ¥ f pϑq for any ϑ ¥ ϑ sr . By (3), there exists a run equilibrium encompassing all banks with ϑpiq ϑ sr if:
Rewriting condition 4 yields:
Hence condition 4 is fulfilled and the economy exhibits a run equilibrium encompassing all banks with ϑpiq ϑ sr . Suppose next that, in contradiction to item (ii) in lemma 3.1, the economy exhibits a run equilibrium encompassing a bank with ϑpiq θ ¥ ϑ sr . Then the economy exhibits a run equilibrium encompassing all banks with ϑpiq ¤θ. (This follows from the fact that, by (2), any bank that is susceptible to a run at some liquidation price p I will also be susceptible to run at any liquidation price p P ¤ p I ). Repeating the same steps as before, the economy exhibits a run equilibrium encompassing all banks with ϑpiq ¤θ only if:
Sinceθ ¥ f pθq, condition 5 is violated and we arrive at a contradiction.
The main implication of lemma 3.1 is that a run encompassing all banks with ϑpiq ϑ sr is the largest run that is possible, that is, the run encompassing the largest set of banks. In the remainder of the paper, a systemic run denotes a run encompassing all banks with ϑpiq ϑ sr . The total fundamental value of assets liquidated in a systemic run is given by D pi I | ϑpiq ϑ sr q and will sometimes be referred to as the magnitude of systemic runs. For future reference it will be useful to denote p sr as the liquidation price in a systemic run: 
The fraction of uninsured deposits a bank can pay out in a systemic run increases in the share of insured deposits at the bank, ϑpiq, and the liquidation price p sr . If bank i is not susceptible to runs, then we have ϕp¤q 1.
Equilibrium selection is driven by an exogenous sunspot variable ξ t0, 1u that realizes at the beginning of period 1. Households select the no-run equilibrium if ξ 0 occurs and they select the systemic run equilibrium if ξ 1 occurs, in case the economy exhibits a systemic run equilibrium.
16 ξ 1 occurs with some probability π r ¡ 0 and ξ 0 occurs with probability 1 ¡ π r .
I will now illustrate by way of an example why the magnitude of systemic runs in this economy depends on the distribution of insured and uninsured deposits across banks. Figure 2 shows three alternative structures of the financial system, with an identical total amount of insured deposits (in grey) and uninsured deposits (in white) outstanding. Secondary market capacity is given by It follows that systemic runs in this economy encompass the entire financial system.
The middle of figure 2 shows a dual financial system in which deposits are distributed in such a way that all insured deposits are held in sector A (the 'commercial banking sector') of the financial system and all uninsured deposits are held in sector B (the 'shadow banking sector'). that encompasses sector A of the financial system. Sector B, which is still susceptible to systemic runs, is smaller compared to the previous situation. As a result, a relatively smaller part of the financial system is susceptible to systemic runs compared to the situation depicted in the middle of figure 2. In general, the magnitude of systemic runs is minimized by setting sector B to the smallest size at which it is large enough to absorb enough of the uninsurable deposits from sector A to make sure that sector A is not susceptible to systemic runs.
Optimal Structure of the Financial System
In this section, I derive the structure of the financial system that maximizes welfare, taken as given the deposit insurance cap θ. Welfare is defined as the integral over expected utility of households, with equal weight given to all households. The structure of the financial system is given by two integrable functions pδpiq, ϑpiqq, where δpiq : I Ñ R denotes the face value of deposits issued by bank i and, as before, ϑpiq : I Ñ r0, 1s denotes the share of insured deposits among the deposits issued by bank i.
I impose two additional restrictions on the welfare maximization problem. First, all households must receive an identical portfolio of deposits in period 0. This rules out the (arguably uninteresting) allocation where each bank serves exactly one household, which would eliminate the coordination problem inherent to bank runs. Second, the aggregate face value of deposits must be equal to 1, which implies that the entire period 0-endowment is invested, and the aggregate face value of deposits equals the aggregate investment return. This is equivalent to saying that the aggregate face value of deposits must be the same as in a competitive allocation (see section 5). This reflects the fact that the present paper is concerned with the optimal distribution of insured and uninsured deposits across banks, not with the optimal amount of short-term debt. It also implies that the total face value of deposits issued by some set I I of banks must be identical (not lower) than the fundamental value of assets held by these banks. As before DpI I q ³ I 1 δpiq di denotes the total face value of deposits issued by banks I I , which corresponds to the total fundamental value of assets held by banks I I .
The only uncertainty at the aggregate level stems from the realization of the sunspot variable ξ.
By a law of large numbers, idiosyncratic risk regarding the order in the line at individual banks in case of a systemic run is eliminated, given that each depositor holds deposits at a continuum of different banks. 17 Consumption c 1 of depositors is thus only subject to aggregate risk related to the realization of ξ. If households select the no-run equilibrium (ξ 0), then consumption of households in period 1 is equal to the fundamental value (the end of period 1 return) of the period 0 investment. If households select the systemic run equilibrium (ξ 1), then consumption of households equals the fundamental value of the period 0 investment minus losses caused by the run. Total losses in a systemic run (from the point of households) are equal to the fundamental value of claims sold to outside investors minus the amount outside investors pay for it. The latter simply equals outside investors' total endowment λ S . Recall that a systemic run encompasses all banks whose share of insured deposits is strictly below ϑ sr , where ϑ sr is the fixed point defined in lemma 3.1. Furthermore, any payments made by deposit insurance in period 1 represent transfers from households to themselves, so that they cancel out in the aggregate. Consumption of households in case of no run (ξ 0) and a systemic run (ξ 1) respectively can thus be expressed as: 
It follows immediately from (8) and (9) that the optimal structure of the financial system is such that it minimizes the total loss caused by a systemic run. We proceed with the following result:
Lemma 4.1. The optimal structure of the financial system satisfies Dpi I | ϑpiq 0q In the following, I will label banks with no insured deposits (ϑpiq 0) 'shadow banks', and banks with (at least some) insured deposits (ϑpiq ¡ 0) 'commercial banks'. The sets of commercial-and shadow banks respectively are denoted by I CB and I SB . The (relative) sizes of the two sectors are given by DpI CB q and DpI SB q, with DpI CB q DpI SB q 1. Without loss of generality, I restrict attention to allocations in which the share of insured deposits at all commercial banks is set to the same level ϑ CB ¥ ϑ sr . Since insuring more deposits entails no social cost, it is always optimal to insure the maximum possible amount of deposits, that is:
The fact that commercial banks are not susceptible to systemic runs in the optimal structure of the financial system (lemma 4.1) implies that the share of insured deposits at commercial banks ϑ CB must be above a certain threshold:
The proof is given in appendix A.1. The sketch of the proof goes as follows: If commercial banks are susceptible to runs, then shadow banks must be susceptible to runs as well. It follows that commercial banks are not susceptible to runs if and only if they are not susceptible to runs in a hypothetical situation where all banks liquidate their portfolios, in which case the liquidation price equals p λ S . The rest then follows from condition 2.
Combining (10) with lemma 4.2, and inserting DpI CB q 1 ¡ DpI SB q, yields the following condition on the relative size of the shadow banking sector in the optimal structure of the financial system: 
According to proposition 4.1, the deposit insurance cap θ can be divided into three regions. The three regions are also illustrated in Figure 4 further below, which depicts how the optimal size of the shadow banking sector (green line/area) depends on the cap θ, for an economy with secondary market capacity λ . This means that the smallest size of the shadow banking sector at which the commercial banking sector is not susceptible to systemic runs is such that shadow banks are susceptible to systemic runs. At this level of the cap it is not feasible to avoid systemic runs altogether. The magnitude of systemic runs is minimized by setting the shadow banking to 18 Within this region of the cap, we have that 1 ¡ θ D max SB , which means that the shadow banking sector is not susceptible to systemic runs even if it is larger than the share of uninsurable deposits. Hence the constraint (10) may be slack within this region of θ.
the smallest size necessary to absorb enough uninsurable deposits from the commercial banking sector. 
Competitive Equilibrium
In a competitive allocation, banks sell demand deposits to households in period 0. A demand deposit contract offered by a bank i stipulates the return rpiq which the bank pays at the end of period 1 per unit of good invested into the bank in period 0. Denoteμpiq as the amount of good invested in intermediary i by a (representative) household. 19 Thenδpiq μpiq rpiq denotes the face value of deposits held at bank i by the household. Households (depositors) can withdraw the full amountδpiq already at the beginning of period 1. When buying deposits from banks, households choose for which deposits to obtain deposit insurance. Denoteθpiq r0, 1s as the fraction of deposits held at bank i for which a household obtains deposit insurance. Household's portfolio 19 The indices for households are omitted throughout. Throughout the paper, I limit attention to symmetric equilibria, where symmetric means that all households make the same portfolio choice in period 0. choice in period 0 can then be expressed as choosing two integrable functions pδpiq,θpiqq subject to the budget constraint and the cap on insured deposits. 
A (symmetric) equilibrium is a tuple pδpiq,θpiq, δpiq, ϑpiq, rpiqq so that: (i) households' portfolio choice pδpiq,θpiqq is such that households maximize expected utility according to (12); (ii) deposit contracts rpiq offered by banks are such that no bank has a profitable deviation and (iii) the aggregate structure of the financial system corresponds to individual choices, pδpiq,θpiqq pδpiq, ϑpiqq.
First we can note that, since deposits at different banks are perfect substitutes, competition among banks will drive banks' profits to zero in equilibrium. This implies that the return paid by banks in equilibrium equals the return to the investment technology, that is, rpiq 1 for all banks in equilibrium. This follows from the fact that banks face an infinitely elastic demand for insured 20 Intuitively, the return received from a portfolio of uninsured deposits in a systemic run by an individual household h should be given by ³ I Ipiq h p1¡θpiqqδpiq di where Ipiq h is random and takes the value 1 if household h is early in the line at bank i and can withdraw her deposits (or if bank i is not susceptible to runs) and 0 if household h is late in the line at bank i. Since the order of the line is random and independent at each bank, the sample path Ipiq h is generally not measurable. See, for instance, Uhlig (1996) and Al-Najjar (2004) for possible remedies. 21 Since households attach no value to consumption in period 0, and utility is strictly increasing in period 1 consumption, it is without loss of generality to set the budget constraint to equality.
deposits and, by the usual argument of Bertrand, the only equilibrium is one in which all banks offer rpiq 1. (13) The key difference between the competitive equilibrium and the welfare maximization problem (9) is that households take as given the aggregate structure of the financial system pδpiq, ϑpiqq and aggregate financial stability (represented by the liquidation price p sr ) when making their portfolio decision in period 0.
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If systemic runs can occur in the economy pp sr 1q, then uninsured deposits at banks with a higher share of insured deposits dominate uninsured deposits at banks with a lower share of insured deposits. The reason is that ϕp¤q is increasing in ϑpiq, that is, the probability that an uninsured deposit can be withdrawn in a run is increasing in the share of insured deposits held at the bank.
(This results from the fact that insured deposits are not withdrawn in a run). If the share of insured deposits is above ϑ sr , then the bank will not be affected by the systemic run at all. (Lemma 3.1).
If systemic runs cannot occur in the economy pp sr 1q, then all deposits pay the same (riskless) return, independent of the share of insured and uninsured deposits at a bank. It follows that, when 22 When deciding at which banks to hold their uninsured deposits, depositors prefer banks offering a higher return rpiq to those offering a lower return as well, if the banks are otherwise identical (that is, if the fraction of insured and uninsured deposits held at the two banks is the same). This implies that, in a situation where all banks offer rpiq 1, offering a lower return does not constitute a profitable deviation since this would not allow to attract any deposits (insured or uninsured). It also implies that rpiq 1 for all banks in equilibrium if there is no deposit insurance (θ 0), by the same argument as above.
choosing how to invest the uninsurable part of their endowment, households weakly prefer banks with a higher share of insured deposits. 24 In particular, households never have an incentive to invest into 'shadow banks' with no insured depositors. This leads us to the following proposition:
Proposition 5.1. In equilibrium it holds that:
(i) Either all banks are susceptible to systemic runs or none are.
(ii) If systemic runs occur, then the share of insured deposits equals ϑpiq θ for all banks.
Since households never have a strict incentive to invest into shadow banks, it is a somewhat trivial result that the size of the shadow banking sector in the competitive allocation is (weakly) smaller than the optimal size as given in proposition 4.1. From section 4 we know that it is not feasible to avoid systemic runs if the cap on insured deposits (θ) satisfies θ p1 ¡ λ S q 2 . It thus follows from proposition 5.1 that the shadow banking sector is strictly smaller than the optimal size if θ p1¡λ S q 2 . At this level of the cap, the optimal structure of the financial system features a shadow banking sector prone to systemic runs. This does not constitute a competitive equilibrium of the economy because households would have an incentive to move uninsured (and uninsurable) deposits from the unstable shadow banking sector into the stable commercial banking sector, thereby causing the commercial banking to become susceptible to systemic runs as well.
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Fees on Commercial Bank Deposits
The setting is now modified in the following way. Before posting deposit contracts, banks need to decide whether to get access to deposit insurance. If a bank decides not to get access to deposit 24 Note also that it is always (weakly) optimal for households to hold the maximum possible amount in insured deposits, given that deposit insurance entails no fee. If systemic runs occur, then uninsured deposits are risky and it is strictly optimal to hold the maximum amount θ in insured deposits.
25 If the cap is within the region θ rp1 ¡ λ S q 2 , p1 ¡ λ S qs, then systemic runs do not occur in the economy if the shadow banking sector is at the "right size" (see section 4). If systemic runs do not occur, returns paid by banks do not depend on the share of insured deposits ϑpiq. This implies that a situation in which the shadow banking sector is "accidentally" at the right size so that systemic runs do not occur, constitutes an equilibrium of the economy if θ rp1 ¡ λ S q 2 , p1 ¡ Λqs. Since households never have a strict incentive to invest into shadow banks, it is questionable how plausible this equilibrium is. In any case, there is also an equilibrium in which shadow banks do not exist and systemic runs affect the entire financial system if θ rp1 ¡ λ
insurance, it will be labelled a 'shadow bank' and households cannot obtain deposit insurance for the deposits issued by the bank. Banks that decide to get access to deposit insurance will be labelled 'commercial banks'. Households can, but do not have to, obtain deposit insurance for deposits issued by commercial banks. The cap on deposit insurance applies as before. Deposit insurance charges a fee on all deposits issued by commercial banks, insured or uninsured. The setting studied in this section is motivated by real-world institutional features; many deposit insurance schemes require commercial banks to pay a fee on deposits. 26 The focus of this section is to derive the structure of the financial system that results in a competitive equilibrium under this institutional framework, and compare it to the optimal structure of the financial system as derived in section 4.
The main difference compared to section 5 is that households now have an incentive to hold deposits at shadow banks instead of commercial banks in order to avoid the fee charged on commercial bank deposits.
The fee on commercial bank deposits equals a fraction τ of the face value of deposits and is charged directly on households after they have withdrawn the deposit from the bank. The results regarding the optimal size of the shadow banking sector derived in section 4 are not affected by the fee.
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Deposit insurance payments can now be seen as being partly financed by fee revenue and partly by lump-sum taxes if the fee revenue is not sufficient. Any fee revenue not used for deposit insurance payments is rebated to households in a lump-sum fashion at the end of period 1.
The definition of the equilibrium in the economy with a fee on commercial bank deposits is analogous to section 5 except for the explicit distinction between commercial banks and shadow banks.
Competition among banks again implies that all banks offer rpiq 1 in equilibrium. Insured deposits at commercial banks pay a riskless return of p1 ¡ τ qrpiq p1 ¡ τ q. Uninsured deposits at commercial banks pay a return p1 ¡ τ q if they can be withdrawn and zero otherwise. Shadow bank deposits pay a return rpiq 1 if they can be withdrawn from the bank and zero otherwise. In the U.S., all bank liabilities are included in the assessment base used to determine the fees banks need to pay to the FDIC. Before the Dodd-Frank Act, the assesment base was total domestic deposits. 27 In particular, the fee is set up in such a way that it does not affect the face value of outstanding deposits in period 1.
If the fee were charged in period 0, or if it were charged on banks rather than directly on households, the aggregate fee revenue would affect the aggregate face value of outstanding deposits in period 1, even if by very little.
gous to before, the subsets of banks operating as commercial banks and shadow banks are denoted by I CB and I SB respectively and the (relative) sizes of the two sectors are given by DpI CB q and DpI SB q. I will sometimes say that a given sector is 'unstable' if it is susceptible to systemic runs and 'stable' if it is not.
In a systemic run, a commercial bank i I CB can pay out a fraction ϕpϑpiq, p sr q of its uninsured deposits, where ϕp¤q is increasing in the share of insured deposits ϑpiq and the liquidation price p sr (see (7) If follows from lemma 6.1 that we only need to consider two types of equilibria:
(i) Equilibria in which a stable commercial banking sector coexists with a shadow banking sector susceptible to systemic runs. (Labelled type A equilibria).
(ii) Equilibria in which systemic runs affect all banks. (Labelled type B equilibria).
Before proceeding, I add the following assumption about parameters: Losses caused by systemic runs on the shadow banking sector are increasing in the size of the shadow banking sector, which implies that the relative attractiveness of shadow bank deposits decreases as the shadow banking sector grows. 29 Denoteα A r0, 1s as the share of a household's deposits held at shadow banks, with the remaining fraction p1 ¡α A q held at commercial banks.
Households optimally chooseα A , taking as given the aggregate structure of the financial system. 28 In a systemic run, shadow banks can pay out a fraction ϕp0, p sr q p sr of deposits. The probability of a systemic run equals π r . Hence the ex ante expected return to shadow bank deposits, given that p sr λ S , equals p1¡π r q π r λ S .
Assumption 6.1 can be rewritten as 1 ¡ τ ¡ p1 ¡ π r q π r λ S . 29 The only other effect of an increase in the size of the shadow banking sector from the point of view of an individual household is that the fee revenue rebated by the deposit insurance agency decreases as a result of the smaller size of the commercial banking sector, which affects consumption in all states identically. Note also that, since systemic runs only encompass the shadow banking sector, deposit insurance never needs to make payments in a type A equilibrium.
Expected utility is continuous, as well as strictly concave inα A (see appendix B). By the theorem of the maximum, households' optimal investment into the shadow banking sector, denotedα The formal proof of lemma 6.2 is given in appendix A.2. The intuition goes as follows: The fact that shadow banks are susceptible to systemic runs implies that the size of the shadow banking sector satisfies DpI SB q ¡ λ S in any type A equilibrium. However, as DpI SB q approaches λ S from above, losses caused by runs on shadow banks go to zero (see 14). By the same reasoning as in lemma 6.1 this implies that it is optimal to invest only in shadow banks (α opt A 1) if the relative size of the shadow banking sector is higher, but very close to, λ S . On the other hand, the upper bound on the fee τ in assumption 6.1 implies that it is optimal to invest only in commercial banks (α opt A 0) as the relative size of the shadow banking sector approaches one. To summarize, households' optimal choice, given that the economy is in a type A equilibrium, satisfies:
A pDpI SB6 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 7 A is the size of the shadow banking sector in the only candidate for a type A equilibrium. The size of the shadow banking sector in a type A equilibrium is such that households are indifferent at the margin between investing into the shadow banking sector, which is prone to systemic runs, and paying the fee τ on commercial bank deposits. Sinceα (16) Inserting DpI CB q 1 ¡ DpI SB q into condition (16) we get that, given the relative size of the shadow banking sector equals DpI SB q D ¦ SB,A , a stable commercial banking sector is feasible if and only if the share of insurable deposits satisfies: The comparative statics regarding the relative size of the shadow banking sector in the type A equilibrium (D ¦ SB,A ) are rather straightforward: All else equal, D ¦ SB,A increases in the fee on commercial bank deposits (τ ) as well as secondary market capacity (λ S ), and decreases in the probability of systemic runs (π r ) as well as the degree of households' risk aversion. I refer to appendix B for a formal derivation of the comparative statics results. Note that changes in the deposit insurance cap θ have no effect on the size of the shadow banking sector in a type A equilibrium as long as θ stays above θ A . If θ decreases below θ A , the economy moves to a type B equilibrium, with an ambiguous effect on the size of the shadow banking sector (see below). Different to a type A equilibrium, the magnitude of systemic runs does not depend on the size of the shadow banking sector.
Type B equilibria
Insured commercial bank deposits pay a riskless return of 1¡τ . The upper bound on τ (assumption 6.1) means that, in a situation in which systemic runs affect the entire financial system, insured commercial bank deposits are preferred to uninsured deposits at any bank. Hence, different to a type A equilibrium, in a type B equilibrium households will always hold the maximum possible amount (θ) in insured commercial bank deposits. This implies that condition (16) is binding in a type B equilibrium. The relevant choice of households is therefore how to allocate the uninsurable part of their deposits between commercial banks and shadow banks. When deciding how to allocate the uninsurable part of their deposits between commercial banks and shadow banks, households again trade off the fee charged on uninsured commercial bank deposits against lower losses caused by runs due to the presence of insured depositors.
Given that the share of insured deposits at commercial banks equals ϑ CB , the fraction of uninsured deposits that can be withdrawn from commercial banks in a systemic run equals ϕpϑ CB , λ
. Denoter CB,B pϑ CB , ξq as the effective return to a portfolio of uninsured commercial bank deposits in a type B equilibrium in state of nature ξ. We have:
effective return on uninsured commercialbank deposits hkkkkkkkikkkkkkkĵ r CB,B pϑ CB , ξq 6 9 9 9 9 8 9 9 9 9 7
The effective return to a portfolio of shadow bank deposits in a type B equilibrium is given by:
effective return on shadow bank deposits hkkkikkkĵ r SB,B pξq 6 9 9 9 8 9 9 9 7 1 if ξ 0 (no run)
Note that uninsured commercial bank deposits are the more attractive relative to shadow bank deposits the higher the share of insured deposits in the commercial banking sector, ϑ CB . Denote the share of a household's uninsurable deposits invested into shadow banks byα B r0, 1s. Households' expected utility is continuous, as well as strictly concave inα B (see appendix C). By the theorem of the maximum, households' optimal choice, denotedα The formal proof of lemma 6.3 is given in appendix A.3. The intuition goes as follows. The fact that commercial banks are susceptible to systemic runs implies that ϑ CB 1 ¡ λ S in any type B equilibrium (lemma 4.2). However, as ϑ CB approaches 1 ¡ λ S from below, actual losses caused by runs for uninsured depositors at commercial banks go to zero (see 18). Hence for ϑ CB below, but very close to, 1¡λ S it is optimal to hold all uninsured deposits at commercial banks (α opt B 1). On the other hand, in the limit as ϑ CB approaches zero from above, losses caused by runs at commercial banks are the same as on shadow banks, while commercial bank deposits entail the fee τ . Hence for ϑ CB close enough to zero, it is optimal to hold all uninsured deposits at shadow banks (α opt B 0).
To summarize, households' optimal choice, given that the economy is in a type B equilibrium, satisfies:α opt B pϑ CB q 6 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 7
By market clearing, we have that DpI SB q p1 ¡ θqα B in equilibrium. By setting expression (16) to equality and inserting DpI SB q 1 ¡ DpI CB q, we can express the share of insured deposits at commercial banks as an increasing function of households' investment into shadow banks:
. Since shadow banks absorb uninsurable deposits from the commercial banking sector, the share of insured deposits at commercial banks is increasing in the size of the shadow banking sector. Hence a larger shadow banking sector implies lower losses caused by runs on commercial banks and therefore increases the relative attractiveness of uninsured commercial bank deposits compared to shadow bank deposits. Similar to the type A equilibrium, we can therefore conclude that optimal investment into shadow banksα opt B must be decreasing in the size of the shadow banking sector. 30 It follows that we can express households' optimal choice as a continuous and decreasing functionα It then remains to check whether, at DpI SB q D ¦ SB,B , the economy is indeed in a type B equilibrium, that is, in a situation in which all banks are susceptible to systemic runs as has been presumed in (20) . This is the case if and only if the share of insured deposits at commercial banks satisfies 30 As in the type A equilibrium, the only other effect of a larger shadow banking sector from the point of view of an individual household is that the fee revenue rebated from the deposit insurance agency decreases as a result of the smaller commercial banking sector. This affects consumption in all states identically. In case of a systemic run, the tax raised by deposit insurance equals the aggregate face value of insured deposits (θ), independent of the size of the shadow banking sector.
The proof is given in appendix A.4. Intuitively, if the share of insurable deposits is relatively high (θ ¥ 1¡λ S ), then there is no equilibrium in which systemic runs affect the entire financial system.
Next, I will show that if the cap θ is not too far below 1 ¡ λ S , then only commercial banks (and no shadow banks) exist in a type B equilibrium. To see this, note first that, if all uninsured deposits are held at commercial banks (α B 0) then the share of insured deposits at commercial banks equals ϑ CB p0q θ. Now suppose we have θ rϑ, 1 ¡ λ
This means that, in a situation in which all uninsurable deposits are held at commercial banks, systemic runs affect the entire financial system. At the same time, since ϑ CB p0q ¥ ϑ, it is optimal for households to hold all uninsurable deposits at commercial banks in this situation. It follows that the economy exhibits a type B equilibrium with only commercial banks and no shadow banks
q, where ϑ may itself depend on θ. Intuitively, in a situation of low aggregate financial stability in which the entire financial system is prone to systemic runs, it can be privately optimal for households to hold all uninsured deposits at commercial banks rather than investing into even less stable shadow banks. This is only true if the cap on deposit insurance, and hence the share of insured deposits at commercial banks, is not all too low however. If ϑ CB p0q θ ϑ, then the stability provided by the (low) share of insured deposits at commercial banks does not compensate for the fee on commercial bank deposits anymore and households will hold part of their uninsurable deposits in shadow banks. This leads us to the following proposition whose proof is given in appendix 6.3. To illustrate why the economy exhibits multiple equilibria for a certain range of the cap θ, suppose that the cap is within θ rθ A , 1 ¡ λ S q and all endowment is invested into commercial banks. Then the share of insured deposits in the commercial banking sector equals ϑ CB θ 1 ¡ λ S and, by lemma 4.2, the commercial banking sector, and therefore the entire financial system, is prone to systemic runs. From proposition 6.3 we know that this situation may constitute a type B equilibrium of the economy. 31 Suppose now that, starting from an equilibrium with only commercial banks, a large part of the uninsured (and uninsurable) deposits is moved at once from the commercial banking sector into a newly created shadow banking sector. If a large enough part of uninsured deposits is moved from commercial banks into shadow banks, the share of insured deposits at commercial banks (ϑ CB ) will become higher than 1 ¡ λ S , which implies that the commercial banking sector will not be prone to systemic runs anymore. The resulting increase in aggregate financial stability (captured by an increase in the liquidation price p sr ) lowers riskiness of both shadow bank deposits and uninsured commercial bank deposits. However the effect is more pronounced for shadow bank deposits, making shadow bank deposits relatively more attractive compared to uninsured commercial bank deposits. This reflects the fact that the change in p sr has a one-to-one effect on the effective return to shadow bank deposits in a systemic run, while the effect on uninsured commercial bank deposits is mitigated by the fact that insured depositors at commercial banks do not participate in runs. As a result, given that aggregate financial stability (p sr ) has increased, it is now privately optimal for households to invest part of their endowment into shadow banks. The new situation with a shadow banking sector and a smaller extent of systemic runs therefore constitutes an equilibrium of the economy as well. Figure 6 shows the relative size of the shadow banking sector in the competitive equilibria compared to the the optimal size (as described in proposition 4.1) for the economy of example 6.1. As before, the X-axes show the share of uninsurable deposits in the economy. The dotted lines are the 45 ¥ -lines.
If the share of uninsurable deposits satisfies 1 ¡ θ ¤ λ S , then the type A equilibrium is the only equilibrium of the economy and the shadow banking sector is larger than the optimal size. If the share of uninsurable deposits is at such a low level, then the optimal structure of the financial system features a relatively small shadow banking sector or no shadow banking sector at all. However, households have a private incentive to invest into shadow banks in order to avoid the fee imposed on commercial bank deposits. The shadow banking sector grows up to a size at which households are indifferent at the margin between investing in (stable) commercial banks and (unstable) shadow banks. We have the opposite situation if the share of uninsurable deposits satisfies
If the share of uninsurable deposits is at such a high level, then the type B equilibrium is the only equilibrium of the economy and the shadow banking sector is smaller than the optimal size. The optimal structure of the financial system features an unstable shadow banking sector (of a size larger than in a hypothetical type A equilibrium) that coexists with a stable commercial banking sector.
This allocation does not constitute an equilibrium due to households' private incentive to move uninsurable deposits from the unstable shadow banking sector into the stable commercial banking sector. If the share of uninsurable deposits is within the region θ rλ S , 1 ¡ θ A q, then the shadow banking sector may be larger or smaller than the optimal size, depending on which equilibrium (type A or type B) is selected.
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In this section, I assumed that the deposit insurance agency charges a fee on all commercial bank deposits, insured or uninsured, which seems a reasonable description of current policies. Consider now an alternative situation where all banks have access to deposit insurance and the fee is only charged on insured deposits. A result equivalent to lemma 6.1 would still hold, implying that systemic runs occur in every competitive equilibrium. The reason is that households only have an incentive to pay the fee on insured deposits if systemic runs make an investment into uninsured deposits risky. In addition, given that systemic runs occur, households have an incentive to hold uninsured deposits at these intermediaries with the highest share of insured deposits (see the discussion in section 5). Hence the only equilibrium of this economy is an equilibrium where all banks have an identical share of insured deposits and systemic runs affect the entire financial system. The equilibrium of this economy essentially corresponds to item (ii) in proposition 5.1 except that the 33 In the special case where 1 ¡θ 1 ¡θ A and the economy is in a type A equilibrium, the size of the shadow banking sector corresponds to the optimal size.
share of insured deposits at the representative commercial bank is endogenous and is such that households are indifferent at the margin between paying the fee for deposit insurance and bearing losses caused by runs on the representative bank.
Implementing the Optimal Size of the Shadow Banking Sector
It remains the question how a regulator can implement the optimal size of the shadow banking sector in a competitive equilibrium, taking as given the deposit insurance scheme in place. Consider first the setting of section 5, where obtaining deposit insurance is costless for households and the equilibrium size of the shadow banking sector is weakly smaller than the optimal size. Implementing the optimal size of the shadow banking sector requires that the share of uninsured deposits among all deposits held at banks that issue insured deposits ('commercial banks') be limited to λ S . This can be achieved with a tax scheme that disincentivizes households to hold more than a fraction λ S of their deposits purchased from commercial banks as uninsured deposits. For instance, the regulator could impose a marginal tax on all uninsured deposits that exceed a fraction λ S of the deposits purchased at the same commercial bank. The tax must be such that households prefer shadow bank deposits to uninsured commercial bank deposits that are subject to the tax. Losses caused by systemic runs in the shadow banking sector are increasing in the size of the shadow banking sector.
The larger the size of the shadow banking sector, the higher the incentive for households to move deposits from the unstable shadow banking sector into the stable commercial banking sector. As a result, in order to keep the size of the shadow banking sector at its optimal level, the marginal tax on uninsured commercial bank deposits must be increasing in the share of uninsurable deposits
Things get more complicated if the deposit insurance agency charges a fee on commercial bank deposits as in section 6. In this case, the shadow banking sector can be smaller or larger than the optimal size. A marginal tax on insured commercial bank deposits as described above ensures that the shadow banking sector is not too small relative to the optimal size, but it does not prevent the shadow banking sector from growing too large relative to the optimal size. The shadow banking sector can be larger than the optimal size due to households' private incentive to avoid the fee charged on commercial bank deposits. Preventing the shadow banking sector from growing too large requires that the regulator eliminate these incentive effects, for instance by charging a tax on all shadow bank deposits that is identical to the fee charged on commercial bank deposits by the deposit insurance agency. In the set-up of section 6, the optimal size of the shadow banking sector can thus be implemented with a two-pronged policy that consists of (i) a tax on shadow bank deposits that mimics any fee charged on commercial bank deposits and (ii) a marginal tax on uninsured commercial bank deposits that is charged whenever the amount of uninsured deposits held at a commercial bank exceeds a certain value.
Conclusion
This paper presents a theoretical argument why the distribution of insured and uninsured short-term claims across financial institutions matters for financial stability. If there is significant demand for short-term claims by investors with large endowments relative to the cap on deposit insurance, the presence of a shadow banking sector that issues short-term claims which are not protected by deposit insurance may be beneficial from a financial stability point of view.
One of the main conclusions of this paper is that, in the context of limited deposit insurance, policies aimed at curtailing the shadow banking sector should be viewed with caution. This is especially true if such policies lead to a flow of uninsured deposits into the commercial banking sector.
Of course, these results are derived in a highly stylized environment. For instance, the commercialand shadow banking sectors are modelled as essentially separated from each other, connected only via a common secondary market to which they both sell assets. In reality, there are tight interconnections between commercial-and shadow banks; many shadow banks are owned by parent companies that also own commercial banks and shadow banks are an important provider of shortterm loans to commercial banks. Furthermore, this paper focuses on government-provided deposit insurance, abstracting from other government interventions such as the lender-of-last-resort or implicit bail-out guarantees to commercial banks. Finally, the underlying causes of the demand for 
B Solving for the type A equilibrium
The relevant choice variable in a type A equilibrium isα A , the share of households' endowment invested into the SB sector. Denote c A 1 pα A , ξq as consumption of a household at t=1 if sunspot ξ realizes, given the economy is in a type A equilibrium. Denote T pξq as the tax levied by the deposit insurance agency, minus the fee revenue rebated. 
We have that:
d Erupc 
The left hand side (LHS) of expression (28) risk aversion shifts LHS upwards, and an increase in τ shifts RHS upwards and LHS downwards.
This leads to the comparative static results mentioned in the main text.
C Solving for the type B equilibrium
In a type B equilibrium, the relevant choice variable of households isα B , the share of the unin- 
